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ABSTRACT 
Most international intellectual property debates ignore the fundamental 
question of how to optimize the global environment for innovation, focusing 
instead on whether a particular policy benefits or harms a particular country.  
The cost of this misplaced focus is significant as states fight bitterly over how 
to divide fixed benefits, rather than seeking to grow social welfare through 
greater innovation. This missed opportunity is not a surprise, however, given 
the difficulty of trying to identify which intellectual property regimes will 
support greater innovation, a task that has proven impossible to achieve 
directly. 
This Article introduces a new empirical methodology that leverages 
international trade data in an effort to identify indirectly which intellectual 
property regimes are more likely to provide greater incentives to innovate 
globally. A country’s trade balance in high-innovation goods tends to dictate 
the country’s preferences for intellectual property rights regimes. Countries 
that export more innovation than they consume tend to favor strong intellectual 
property rights regimes so as to reap the greatest rents from others, while 
countries that import more innovation than they produce favor weaker 
intellectual property laws so as to take advantage of innovation by others. 
Neither type of country will favor intellectual property regimes that maximize 
global incentives to innovate. Countries that happen to produce and consume 
relatively equivalent value from high-innovation goods, on the other hand, will 
tend to have self-interested incentives for an intellectual property system that 
supports the greatest innovation possible. The method developed here presents 
an original system to try to identify such countries, providing new information 
and insight into the international innovation economy and intellectual property 
law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a striking divergence between intellectual property law discourse at 
the domestic level and at the international level. Domestic intellectual property 
policy debates focus heavily on how to design intellectual property systems that 
will provide the greatest incentives to innovate. Whether an advocate is pressing 
for a stronger or weaker intellectual property regime, the arguments are usually 
framed based on which system will promote the greatest creativity, distribution, 
and commercialization of intellectual works. 
We might expect international intellectual property debates to follow a 
similar course. Instead, the dialogue concerning international intellectual 
property policy is dominated by a tug-of-war between technologically-advanced 
states and developing countries over how to divide the fruits of intellectual 
property spoils. Rather than seeking to optimize the global environment for 
innovation so as to increase the size of the social welfare pie, states instead fight 
bitterly over how to divide the status quo. The cost of this misplaced focus on 
zero-sum contestations in international intellectual property debates is likely 
significant. This Article first explains why the political economy of 
international intellectual property disputes generally ignores the objective of 
optimizing innovation and then presents an original empirical framework that 
can be used to pursue a more socially constructive goal. 
International intellectual property disputes, whether involving treaty 
negotiations, judicial proceedings, special interest advocacy, or academic 
discourse, primarily center on the domestic impact of particular intellectual 
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property regimes for individual states and their citizens. Technologically 
advanced states generally press for stronger intellectual property rights, and 
developing countries generally try to resist such pressure in favor of weaker 
intellectual property regimes.1 The dominant questions tend to involve whether 
stronger intellectual property rights are actually in developing countries’ best 
interests, how such countries can push back, and what trade and investment 
concessions resisting states can wring in exchange for agreeing to a stronger 
international intellectual property regime.2 The literature on these debates is 
                                                                                                                       
 
1
 See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES, 84, 89–91 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom 
Ginsburg eds., 2014) [hereinafter Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers] (discussing the 
rise of “middle intellectual property powers” within the traditional dispute of technologically 
advanced states pushing for stronger intellectual property rights regimes and developing 
countries pushing back); Cortney M. Arnold, Protecting Intellectual Property in Developing 
World:  Next Stop—Thailand, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, ¶¶ 4–6, Mar. 27, 2006, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=dltr (arguing that 
more developed countries press for stronger intellectual property rights in order to produce 
trade advantages for high-technology products, while less developed countries resist such 
pressure); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from 
Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400, 
403 (2007) (examining how BRIC nations have pushed pack against what are viewed as 
coercive intellectual property agreements with unfavorable provisions for developing 
nations); Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist 
Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 401, 401 (2004) (arguing that 
more developed nations favor stronger application of international intellectual property 
rights agreements, such as TRIPS).  
  In certain circumstances, for example involving intellectual property rights in genetic 
or cultural resources, less developed countries have sought stronger intellectual property 
protection. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 41–45, 51–58 (2001) (discussing a variety of efforts by indigenous 
peoples and less developed countries to assert intellectual property rights in traditional and 
cultural knowledge); Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible 
Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 437 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Cultural Relics] (discussing 
less-developed countries’ efforts to safeguard intangible cultural heritage through 
intellectual property rights).  
 
2
 See, e.g., Carsten Fink & Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual 
Property Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: 
A WINDOW INTO THE ISSUES 289, 289 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006) (discussing the strong 
intellectual property protections promoted by developed nations such as the U.S. and the 
concessions the U.S. makes for resisting trade partners, including preferential access to U.S. 
markets); James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 261, 326–28 (2002) (arguing that the “coercive bargaining framework” of 
certain international agreements for intellectual property strongly favors developed nations 
to the detriment of developing nations); Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 433, 435–36 (2012) (describing how the intellectual property rights requirements imposed 
by TRIPS can negatively impact the human health and welfare concerns of developing 
countries); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 128 (2004) (indicating 
that the “mandatory minimum standards of intellectual property protection” in TRIPS allows 
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voluminous.3 This Article suggests, however, that these debates often miss a 
more important target. 
Intellectual property regimes are widely understood to exist in order to 
promote the invention, dissemination, and commercialization of intellectual 
works.4 Though attention to this central issue dominates domestic intellectual 
property discourse, it is almost entirely absent from dialogue concerning the 
scope and content of international intellectual property law. Refocusing 
international intellectual property debates on how to increase overall global 
incentives to innovate could have dramatic social welfare effects. By increasing 
incentives to innovate, intellectual property law can grow the innovation pie— 
potentially making all countries better off, rather than devolving into adversarial 
negotiations over how to distribute fixed benefits.5 
Increasing global incentives to innovate is admittedly a more challenging 
problem than negotiating over a fixed set of goods or rights. Innovation is a 
highly complex cognitive and social phenomenon involving significant 
uncertainty, varied creative and motivational influences, and multiple spillover 
and feedback dynamics. All of these factors are very difficult to measure or 
predict. Layered on top of the social phenomena of innovation is the 
complicated legal system of intellectual property law, muddying the analysis 
even further.  These complexities render the relationship between intellectual 
property law and innovation hard to parse and difficult to understand. As a 
consequence, it is often unclear whether any particular change in intellectual 
property law will tend to increase, decrease, or have no significant effect on 
incentives to innovate and the level of innovation overall. This indeterminacy is 
just one reason that states end up bargaining over the domestic effects of 
intellectual property rights in the international context, rather than truly trying 
to maximize global incentives to innovate. 
Optimizing the net incentives to innovate provided by intellectual property 
law requires balancing the benefit of the incentives that intellectual property law 
provides against the costs of exclusivity produced by those very same laws.6 
                                                                                                                       
developed nations to preserve “traditional guarantees of free trade” while recapturing trade 
advantages over developing nations with strong manufacturing economies). 
 
3
 See supra notes 1–2. 
 
4
 See infra Part II. 
 
5
 Identifying the appropriate objectives for countries in international negotiations and 
disputes is, admittedly, a highly contested topic.  See, e.g., Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental 
Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International 
Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 244–45 (2006) (exploring the International Criminal Court 
negotiations as an example of problems with the state-centric model of international law); 
Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal: Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, 18 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 745, 751–52, 777–82, 803–04 (1997) (assessing the traditional state-centric 
model of international law in light of the emerging power of non-state actors in the modern 
era of globalization). 
 
6
 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94, 
1305 (2012) (describing the goal of patent protection as desiring to balance the incentives of 
the promise of exclusive rights against the cost of exclusivity); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
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Though it has proven impossible to measure the trade-offs between incentives 
and exclusivity directly, it may be possible to do so indirectly. The 
methodology introduced here is based on considering that a country’s 
preferences for intellectual property rights expressed at the international level 
are roughly based on an aggregation of the country’s domestic preferences for 
intellectual property rights among its intellectual property producers and 
consumers. Simplifying for the sake of introduction, to the extent a country 
produces and exports greater innovation value to foreign entities than the 
country consumes domestically from foreign industries, the country will favor 
stronger international intellectual property rights, in an effort to capture for 
itself the value of such innovation. Conversely, to the extent a country 
consumes more innovation value than it produces, the country will favor weaker 
intellectual property rights in an effort to free ride off of the innovation of 
others. These net-producing and net-consuming countries’ preferences for 
intellectual property law are not driven by a desire to maximize net incentives to 
innovate globally, but by a desire to maximize the net benefit the country 
receives individually from intellectual property law. 
While most countries will tend to be either net producers or net consumers 
of innovation, some countries, as a result of their particular industry and 
consumer composition, will happen to be relatively balanced in their production 
and consumption of innovation. Balancing the production and consumption 
interests in innovation is precisely the relationship desired to balance the 
incentive versus exclusivity trade-off in intellectual property law. Though these 
balanced countries will be just as self-interested as net-producer and net-
consumer countries, their self-interest happens to align with a relationship that 
will increase net incentives to innovate overall. To the extent these balanced 
countries’ advocacy in international intellectual property debates properly 
aggregates the interests of their domestic innovation producers and consumers, 
such countries will tend to naturally desire an intellectual property regime that 
balances the production and consumption interests in innovation.7 An 
                                                                                                                       
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (describing intellectual property as 
requiring “a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand . . . .”); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal 
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 458–59 (2010) (“Figuring out 
how to trade off exclusive ownership that gives strong incentives for commercialization 
against the free but uncoordinated use of information . . . offers the single greatest challenge 
to preserving the health of the law of copyrights and patents.”).  
 
7
 See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 46–51 (2003) (noting the private sector’s “expertise and 
control over information” in relation to intellectual property rights); Peter Drahos, 
Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 765, 772 (2002) (explaining that private industries often hold superior 
information regarding intellectual property rights concerns, given the lack of government 
data). 
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intellectual property legal regime that successfully equilibrates these interests 
will produce the greatest net incentives to innovate for society overall.8 
Countries with equivalent levels of the production and consumption of 
innovation should desire, for domestic self-interested reasons, international 
intellectual property law that balances the trade-off between the incentive 
benefits and exclusivity costs of intellectual property rights. These countries can 
effectively serve as proxies for evaluating the level of intellectual property 
protection that will optimize private incentives to innovate overall. Identifying 
countries that are relatively balanced in their production and consumption of 
innovation is not an easy task, but, as discussed below, it is a more manageable 
challenge than trying to directly understand the relationship between innovation 
and intellectual property law, and it is a challenge for which we now possess 
substantial empirical information and data. 
Valuable knowledge concerning globally optimal net incentives to innovate 
can thus be captured by analyzing the relationship between the production and 
consumption of innovation at the country level. This relationship can be used to 
signal aggregate private and market information from both innovation industry 
and innovation consumers concerning the actual benefits and costs of 
intellectual property rights, information that has never been captured before. 
Part II of this Article examines the standard considerations of international 
intellectual property debates and elucidates why such approaches miss the 
importance of optimizing overall incentives to innovate. Part III explains the 
trade-off between incentives and access in intellectual property law, and 
introduces the proxy signal framework as a new means for identifying how to 
optimize net incentives to innovate in the international intellectual property law 
context. Part IV explores how the proxy approach can be applied in 
international patent law, utilizing the most recent United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics data concerning the production and consumption of innovation 
by country. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The dominant trope in international intellectual property disputes focuses 
on intellectual property and trade pressures brought by the United States, the 
European Union, Japan, and other technologically advanced countries to 
strengthen intellectual property regimes.9 The BRIC countries10 and other 
                                                                                                                       
 
8
 See infra Part II. 
 
9
 See Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 84; Bird & Cahoy, 
supra note 1, at 403; Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, International Protection of 
Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1635 (2004); Okediji, supra note 2, at 128; 
Walter G. Park, International Patent Protection: 1960–2005, 37 RES. POL’Y 761, 762–64 
(2008); Bruno Salama & Daniel Benoliel, Pharmaceutical Patent Bargains: The Brazilian 
Experience, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 633, 644–52 (2010); Ullrich, supra note 1, at 
427. 
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developing states have pushed back to varying degrees, but have also often 
acquiesced in exchange for certain trade relations or foreign investment.11 The 
political economy of these debates is well-studied, and the motivations behind 
the disputes are relatively straightforward. Private industry in technologically 
advanced countries can profit from the opportunity to charge higher prices for 
intellectual property-protected products in foreign markets, while parties in 
developing countries bear the expense of exclusionary intellectual property 
rights and have limited opportunity to profit from selling their own intellectual 
property products abroad.12 Consequently, a strong international intellectual 
property rights regime is generally economically advantageous to 
technologically advanced countries.  
There have been many high-profile examples of international intellectual 
property disputes along these lines over the past several decades. The United 
States, the European Union, and Japan led the press for the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights13 (TRIPS), the most 
comprehensive international intellectual property rights treaty, over the initial 
objections of India, Brazil, and a number of other developing countries.14 The 
United States has used trade pressure and threats of various sanctions to compel 
Brazil to strengthen patent protection for pharmaceuticals, to drive Russia to 
adopt intellectual property protection for computer programs, and to push China 
to implement stronger patent protection and enforcement.15 More recently, both 
the United States and the European Union have used their trade power to 
negotiate bilateral and other free trade agreements with a number of developing 
countries that require the adoption of stronger domestic intellectual property 
protection regimes than is mandated by TRIPS or other international intellectual 
property treaties.16 
                                                                                                                       
 
10
 BRIC is an acronym that refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, all rising 
economic powers on the global stage. 
 
11
 Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 100–02; Bird & Cahoy, 
supra note 1, at 403; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 9, at 644–53.  
 
12
 Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 87–88; Park, supra note 9, 
at 764; Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 415, 418 (2004). 
 
13
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
 
14
 Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 100; Robert C. Bird, 
Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 322–
29 (2006); Bird & Cahoy, supra note 1, at 403; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1695 n.7 (2008). 
 
15
 Bird, supra note 14, at 327–31.  
 
16
 Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 88–89; Fink & 
Reichenmiller, supra note 2, at 289; Arnold, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9–11; Amy Kapczynski, The 
Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE 
L.J. 804, 825 (2008); Okediji, supra note 2, at 128–29; Raymundo Valdés & Runyowa 
Tavengwa, Intellectual Property Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements 18–19 (World 
Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2012-21, 2012); Rohan K. George, Does One Size 
Fit All? A Comparative Study to Determine an Alternative to International Patent 
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Though these and other international intellectual property disputes have 
been well-studied,17 generally overlooked in the political economy analysis is 
the focus that should be the central objective of intellectual property rights: 
optimizing the incentives and environment for innovation.18 At the domestic 
level, on the other hand, optimizing incentives to innovate is commonly 
recognized as the dominant goal of intellectual property law in most policy 
arguments and analyses, both by those who favor stronger intellectual property 
protection and by those who argue that weaker intellectual property rights 
would strengthen the environment for innovation.19 The reason for this focus in 
national law is that at the domestic level states both reap the benefit of the 
incentives created by their intellectual property regimes and bear the burden of 
the costs of exclusion produced by the regime. As a consequence, states roughly 
internalize both the positive and negative externalities of domestic intellectual 
property law,20 and therefore seek a national intellectual property legal regime 
that balances these interests so as to optimize the incentives to innovate. 
The international political economy of intellectual property rights is 
different. Domestic self-interest makes profits earned abroad from intellectual 
property rights an unmitigated benefit.21 As opposed to the national law sphere 
where domestic consumers must bear the burden of intellectual property rights, 
foreign-borne limitations on access or consumer deadweight losses created by 
intellectual property rights are effectively irrelevant to domestic political 
                                                                                                                       
Harmonization 7–8 (Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference 
Papers, Paper No. 28, 2009). 
 
17
 See supra note 1. 
 
18
 See Grossman & Lai, supra note 9, at 1636 (noting the failure of prior literature to 
consider what international intellectual property regime would be globally most efficient).  
Countries certainly sometimes frame their arguments as promoting innovation overall, but 
such frames are usually more rhetorical, rather than being based on any actual intent or 
interest in maximizing global incentives to innovate.  See Kapczynski, supra note 16, at 
848–49 (noting TRIPS advocates’ claims that TRIPS would be beneficial for developing, as 
well as developed, countries); Keith E. Maskus, Lessons from Studying the International 
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2219, 2220 (2000) (noting 
advocacy by supporters of both weaker and stronger intellectual property rights based on the 
overall effects of given policy on innovation). 
 
19
 E.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 11–12 (2008); DAN L. BURK & 
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 100–02 (2009); 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597–
99 (2003). 
 
20
 Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public 
Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 57 (2012). This internalization is only approximate, as 
intellectual property law cannot internalize all of the benefits and costs of innovation. Brett 
M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276–82 (2007) 
(discussing various spillover benefits of innovation that are not internalized by intellectual 
property law). 
 
21
 Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 418.  
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economy interests.22 These innovation and market externalities mean that there 
is effectively a market failure in the international political economy of 
intellectual property, when viewed from the perspective of trying to optimize 
global incentives to innovate.23 As a result, there is no reason to believe that the 
positions pressed by any particular state acting in its own best interests in 
international fora will necessarily align with the international intellectual 
property regime that would best incentivize innovation globally.24 
There is a certain irony to the reality that optimizing net incentives to 
innovate is generally ignored in international intellectual property debates. 
International agreements can only come into existence if all parties to the 
agreement determine that it is in their own best interests.25 Simply shifting 
intellectual property rights profit flows from one state to another cannot achieve 
this objective.26 The fact that shifting profit flows cannot make all states better 
off is why trade rights and promises of foreign direct investment are often 
linked to intellectual property agreements.27 Offering these external benefits is 
the only way that countries that desire stronger intellectual property rights (and 
the concomitant increased profit flows) can entice parties who feel they will get 
short-changed by stronger protection to join the agreement.28 Rather than 
simply shifting profit flows, however, an intellectual property agreement that 
actually increases incentives to innovate globally could produce true efficiency 
gains.  These gains could serve as the basis for international intellectual 
property rights treaties that do not require side-deal sweeteners because they 
actually directly increase the welfare of all party states.29 
                                                                                                                       
 
22
 See Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 420 (discussing the market failure created by 
domestic producers not taking into account foreign consumer deadweight losses). 
 
23
 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 332–33 (2004); Salama & 
Benoliel, supra note 9, at 635–36.  
 
24
 SCOTCHMER, supra note 23, at 332–33; Maskus, supra note 18, at 2222. 
 
25
 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 10–11 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, 
International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 120–21 
(2003); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
581, 609 (2005). 
 
26
 Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 421–22. 
 
27
 See supra note 11. 
 
28
 Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking 
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2011) (explaining 
how the U.S. and European nations made the TRIPS agreement more attractive to 
developing countries concerned about stronger intellectual property rights through 
advantageous trade measures for developing countries); Okediji, supra note 2, at 144 
(discussing the role of trade negotiations as central to the benefits developing countries gain 
in joining international intellectual property agreements such as TRIPS).  
 
29
 See Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 421–22. 
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III. COUNTRIES AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROXIES 
Optimizing incentives to innovate globally is commonly believed to require 
understanding the relationship between intellectual property rights and 
innovation, a seemingly impossible task.30 Innovation is too complex and 
stochastic a phenomena, both cognitively and socially, and the effects of 
intellectual property law are too complicated and dynamic to ever parse this 
relationship directly. Rather than trying to understand the relationship between 
intellectual property law and innovation directly, however, the approach 
introduced here proposes a novel framework that uses signals from private and 
market activity to indirectly reveal the structure of this relationship. These 
proxy signals can then be leveraged to identify which intellectual property laws 
are more likely to increase global incentives to innovate. 
The analysis that follows assumes national treatment of intellectual property 
law.31 That is, it assumes that each country offers the same intellectual property 
protection to both domestic and foreign entities. This assumption is relatively 
accurate, as national treatment of intellectual property rights is mandated by 
numerous treaties to which nearly all countries adhere.32  
For the purposes of introducing the international proxy signal methodology, 
the analysis below focuses on patent law, as opposed to intellectual property 
law generally. An equivalent analysis could be applied to copyright law.33 
                                                                                                                       
 
30
 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 6–7 
(2000); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) (referring to 
balancing the costs and benefits of intellectual property as “impossibly complex”). 
 
31
 See Grossman & Lai, supra note 9, at 1636 (making the same assumption); 
Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 422 (making the same assumption). 
 
32
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/, archived at http://perma.cc/XM6G-DDEG (166 
signatories); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8ZDP-X545 (174 signatories). 
 
33
 Proxy signal analysis is equally applicable to copyright law to the extent copyright 
law is understood to focus on incentives to create and commercialize copyrightable works. 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.  
1569, 1571 (2009); See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913, 932 (2005) (citing the shared underpinnings of copyright and patent law in 
incentivizing the promotion of innovation); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (same); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free 
Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1295 (2003) (articulating that the 
purpose of copyright law is to promote the progress of science, which is realized by the 
dissemination, access, and use of knowledge, in part by granting property rights to authors to 
control the use of their works); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and 
Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 83, 88 (2002) (stating that the right of an individual to profit from their work is a goal 
of both patent and copyright law). 
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Unlike patent and copyright, trademark law is not generally understood to seek 
optimal incentives to innovate, and therefore presents a somewhat different 
matter.34 The analysis also begins with the assumption of globally harmonized 
intellectual property law. This assumption is relatively accurate in certain 
regards, as the forces of TRIPS, trade pressure, and other factors have led many 
countries to adopt remarkably similar domestic patent law systems.35 That said, 
intellectual property law is not perfectly harmonized across jurisdictions at the 
detailed level, as differences (including some significant ones) among various 
countries exist.36 For example, there are differences across jurisdictions in the 
scope of subject matter that is patent-eligible,37 in standards for patent 
validity,38 and in the treatment of pharmaceutical patenting.39 The assumption 
of globally harmonized intellectual property law is relaxed in certain regards 
later in the article.40 
                                                                                                                       
 
34
 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 2.1 (4th ed. 2008) (stating there is a long history of trademark protecting both consumers 
and sellers by facilitating competition, which benefits both parties); Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (2007) 
(contending that the central interest of trademark law is to prevent the illegitimate diversion 
of consumers from producers).  Despite the differences in the objectives of trademark law, 
the underlying procedure of proxy analysis, identifying entities that balance desired trade-
offs, could be applied to trademark law. 
 
35
 Yu, Middle Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 88–89; Land, supra note 2, 
at 435–36; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 9, at 665; Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and 
Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2009); Park, supra note 9, at 762; Grossman & Lai, supra 
note 9, at 1649; Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 420. Efforts to harmonize intellectual property 
rights internationally have a long history, dating back at least to the Berne Convention of 
1886, which harmonized protection among signatory countries for certain intellectual 
property rights, though mostly procedurally. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/, archived at http://perma.cc/XM6G-DDEG.  
 
36
 See generally Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, On the Strength of Intellectual 
Property Protection that Nations Provide, 90 J. DEV. ECON. 50 (2009) (discussing variation 
in substantive patent law across various countries); Lyndon DeSalvo, First Among BRICs: 
Brazil’s Necessary Challenging of TRIPs (March 2010) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Carleton 
College), available at  http://people.carleton.edu/~amontero/Lyndon%20DeSalvo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BQ7Q-9W4J; ROBERT LEWIS-LETTINGTON & PETER MUNYI, 
DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE, WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO USE TRIPS 
FLEXIBILITIES: KENYA CASE STUDY (2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/countries/ken_UseTRIPsFlexibilitiesDFID.pdf. 
 
37
 Kanwar & Evenson, supra note 36, at 50. The United States, Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand generally provide patent protection for a greater scope of subject matter than 
other countries. Id. 
 
38
 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 403–54 (3d ed. 2012). 
 
39
 Id.; DeSalvo, supra note 36, at 1; Lewis-Lettington & Munyi, supra note 36, at 9. 
 
40
 See infra Part III.B. The assumption is only relaxed with respect to allowing 
differential intellectual property law across different industries. Infra Part III.B. Note that 
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Finally, it is worth noting that proxy signal analysis focuses on maximizing 
aggregate incentives to innovate globally.41 Maximizing incentives to innovate, 
so as to optimize overall innovation, is admittedly not the same as maximizing 
the social welfare from innovation.42 Maximizing incentives to innovate, 
however, is a commonly used surrogate,43 and should serve as a valuable first 
step towards increasing overall social welfare.  
A. Patent Law Objectives 
It is generally accepted that the primary objective of patent law is to 
incentivize innovation.44 Absent patent protection, the non-rivalrous and non-
exclusive nature of innovation would lead to a market failure in innovation 
efforts and activity.
45
 Potential inventors would not put the socially optimal 
level of effort and of resources into innovation because once an invention was 
publicly disclosed, competitors and consumers could free ride and copy it at 
will, reducing the inventor’s ability to profit from the invention.46 Patent law 
seeks to solve this market failure through the grant of exclusionary patent 
                                                                                                                       
there is no reason to expect that the harmonization of patent protection internationally is 
necessary for optimizing net incentives to innovate globally. In fact, it is highly likely that 
such harmonization would not efficiently maximize incentives. Grossman & Lai, supra note 
9, at 1649–50. 
 
41
 See Grossman & Lai, supra note 9, at 1637 (defining an efficient patent regime as 
“one that provides the optimal aggregate incentives for innovation to inventors throughout 
the world.”). 
 
42
 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 11–12; Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 
1580–81. 
 
43
 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 11–12; Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 
1580–81. The actual social welfare produced by innovation would be extremely difficult to 
measure. David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration 
and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2009). 
 
44
 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 19, at 67 (“[T]heories of patent law based on moral 
right, reward, or distributive justice . . . are hard to take seriously as explanations for the 
actual scope of patent law.”); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1576 (“Patent law 
is our primary policy tool to promote innovation . . . .”); Robert Cooter et al., The 
Importance of Law in Promoting Innovation and Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH: 
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 1, 3 (The Kauffmann 
Task Force on Law, Innovation, & Growth ed., 2011) (discussing empirical work showing 
that innovation is the most important factor of production for economic growth in the United 
States). 
 
45
 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (discussing 
how the prospect of obtaining a patent monopoly provides an incentive to invest in efforts to 
create new inventions); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 48–59 (8th ed. 
2011). 
 
46
 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 29–32, 34–35; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Competition for Innovation, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 799, 800.  
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rights.47 Exclusionary patent rights provide an inventor with monopoly pricing 
power that allows the inventor to charge a price for her or his invention which 
more closely approaches the value that a consumer places on the invention, 
rather than the free-market cost of production.48 Patent rights thus enable 
inventors to profit off of innovation to the extent of the private value of use of 
the innovation, bringing the private benefits of invention more in line with their 
social value.49 This internalization of innovation externalities provides inventors 
with incentives to invest time, financial resources, and effort into the research, 
development, and commercialization of innovation.
50
 
This incentive theory of patent rights, however, only tells half of the story 
because patent protection is a dual-edged sword. Patent rights not only provide 
incentives to innovate, they also limit access to patented products by increasing 
their price.51 Increasing the price of intellectual property works reduces the 
distribution of such innovation and reduces the opportunity for future 
technological development that improves or builds upon the patented 
innovation.52 Thus, while patent laws that are too weak will limit incentives to 
invest resources and innovate in the first instance, patent laws that are too 
strong create their own barriers to innovation, stifling the further development 
and dissemination of innovation products. 
The goal of patent law is to set a level of patent protection that 
appropriately balances the competing trade-offs between the benefit of 
incentives and the cost of limiting access so as to achieve the greatest aggregate 
net incentives to innovate for society overall.53 The following sections consider 
                                                                                                                       
 
47
 See MERGES, supra note 30, at 154; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 30–31; 
Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51–53, 63 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh 
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002). 
 
48
 See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 1962).  
 
49
 Id. at 623; F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 710 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 133 (2004).  
 
50
 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1989). 
 
51
 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 30–32; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 
47, at 54. 
 
52
 WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 88–90 (1969); Abrams, supra note 43, at 1615; 
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (1990); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) 
(“These [patent validity] limitations serve a critical role in adjusting the tension, ever present 
in patent law, between stimulating innovation by protecting inventors and impeding progress 
by granting patents when not justified . . . .”). 
 
53
 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 
(2012); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 11–12 (identifying the goal of maximizing net 
incentives to innovate); NORDHAUS, supra note 52, at 88–90; F.M. Scherer, The Economic 
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this incentive versus access trade-off in greater depth and examine past attempts 
to identify the optimal balance between them. 
B. The Relationship Between Patent Law and Innovation 
Patent rights provide an incentive to innovate and simultaneously reduce 
access to current and future innovation. The former presents a potentially great 
social benefit; the latter a potentially great social cost. Patent law’s incentives to 
innovate include not just the direct potential of supracompetitive profits, but 
also a number of other benefits that have been identified, including the 
opportunity for firms to signal their technological strength,54 reduce transaction 
costs,55 and price-coordinate.56 If patent rights are too limited or too weak, 
potential innovators will face suboptimal incentives to invest resources and time 
in innovation-producing activities in the first instance.57 Too little innovation 
will occur. 
If patent rights are too expansive or too strong, however, potential 
innovators may face reduced incentives to innovate as well.58 The grant of 
patent rights affects the value and feasibility of future innovation because it 
increases the cost of using the intellectual property of others, due to greater 
licensing and litigation expenses, and reduces incentives for follow-on 
improvement innovation, as any potential profit must now be shared.59 In 
addition, greater propertization can increase the likelihood of patent thickets60 
and anticommons effects,61 each creating costs that reduce the benefit of, and 
                                                                                                                       
Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, in THE MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FINANCE AND 
ECONOMICS 84 (Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber eds., 1977) (“The problem of patent 
policy is to strike a balance: enough protection to sustain a desired flow of innovations, but 
not superfluous protection in view of alternate incentives for innovation and the social 
burdens monopoly power imposes.”). 
 
54
 Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002). 
 
55
 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12–13, 318–25 (2003). 
 
56
 Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 615, 619–20 (2000). 
 
57
 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 11. 
 
58
 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than 
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 8)).  
 
59
 See NORDHAUS, supra note 52, at 76; Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Process: 
How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 407 (2009); Merges 
& Nelson, supra note 52, at 839, 886–88. 
 
60
 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 119, 119 (2000). Patent thickets 
refer to the high transactions costs of having to navigate a field in which there are numerous 
overlapping patents held by numerous entities. Id. 
 
61
 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–700 (1998). Anticommons 
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incentives for, innovation. Somewhere between the extremes of no patent 
incentives and excessive barriers to access lies a level of propertization that can 
maximize the aggregate net incentives to innovate for society. 
In trying to optimize the trade-off between incentives and exclusivity, 
increases in the level of patent protection have two primary effects: they 
increase the incentives for innovators to innovate due to the potential for greater 
supracompetitive profits (thus increasing innovation activity) and 
simultaneously reduce incentives to innovate due to the grant of greater 
exclusive rights to others (thus reducing innovation activity). Starting from a 
point of no patent protection, so long as the marginal benefit of greater 
incentives outweighs the marginal cost of greater exclusion, increasing patent 
protection will increase incentives to innovate overall. As patent rights increase, 
however, the marginal benefit of increased incentives will tend to get smaller 
due to decreasing returns to scale,62 while the marginal cost of exclusionary 
rights will tend to increase due to the increased transaction costs of the network 
effects of greater exclusivity.63 As a result, the relationship between a given 
level of patent protection and the corresponding net incentives or value of 
innovation produced by that level of propertization will have an inverted-U 
form, as presented in Figure 1.64  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
refers to the situation where too many private rights holders own patents in an area such that 
it is expensive to identify who owns which rights or what subject matter can be practiced. Id. 
 
62
 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 20, at 258 (noting the decreasing returns to 
scale of incentives). 
 
63
 See Barnett, supra note 59, at 411 (noting that “as the level of propertization 
increases, marginal transaction costs accelerate”). 
 
64
 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence on the Incentive 
Thesis, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178, 191 (Robert E. Litan ed., 
2011) (presenting cross-country evidence for an inverted-U relationship); Christopher A. 
Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 921, 932–33 (2010) (presenting a similar approach); Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics 
of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 136–39  
(2002) (discussing empirical support for an inverted-U relationship). 
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Figure 1: Intellectual Property Law and Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given any level of patent protection (P), the net incentives for innovation 
produced by that level of protection are denoted by the function I(p). Patent law 
regimes towards the left side of Figure 1 represent commons-style approaches 
with weaker propertization; regimes towards the right side represent exclusivity 
approaches with stronger propertization. The innovation function’s maximum, 
labeled Poptimal in Figure 1, represents the level of propertization that will 
maximize the cumulative net incentives to innovate for society globally.65 At 
Poptimal the marginal benefit of increased incentives is exactly equal to the 
                                                                                                                       
 
65
 See Abrams, supra note 43, at 1615 (explaining that “[t]he optimal patent term is that 
point at which the marginal benefit from increased innovation is exactly offset by the 
marginal cost of the deadweight loss created by the patent right”). Figure 1 depicts the 
strength of patent protection as a single metric, displayed along its x-axis. In practice, any 
given level of patent protection is made up of a number of components, including the scope, 
duration, and enforceability of patent rights. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 64, at 932 
(making this point with respect to several aspects of intellectual property protection); John 
M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 526 (2010) (listing a 
number of components of patent rights). Sometimes, strengthening certain elements, while 
weakening others, could produce a socially superior patent regime, though it may be unclear 
whether such a regime represents “stronger” or “weaker” propertization. One can imagine a 
more complex, multi-dimensional version of Figure 1 that takes into account these different 
components, in which the innovation function is no longer a two-dimensional curve, but a 
multi-dimensional form. For purposes of initial explanation, it is convenient to conceptualize 
patent propertization strength as ordered along a single dimension, considering each point 
along the axis to represent a set of patent rights, involving, for example, particular scope and 
duration of rights. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 64, at 933 (making the same assumption). 
This simplification is for ease of introduction only and is not necessary for proxy signal 
analysis. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 64, at 933 n.32. 
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marginal cost of greater exclusivity.66 Beyond this “sweet spot,” increases in the 
strength of patent protection tend to reduce net incentives to innovate as the 
marginal cost of exclusionary rights outweighs the marginal benefit of increased 
incentives.67 Though Figure 1 happens to display the optimal level of 
propertization towards the middle of the function, this is for presentation 
purposes only, and has no effect on the analysis that follows. 
The foregoing presents the theory and policy behind patent protection. In 
practice, we could never allocate rights so precisely as to achieve the optimal 
level of protection.68 Even if society found itself exactly at the optimal level, it 
is unlikely that we would know.69 Further, even if we could achieve the optimal 
level momentarily, critical real world context, including innovation and 
industries, evolves dynamically, so the optimal target will change over time. We 
can, however, try to develop a patent system that approaches the optimal level 
to the greatest extent possible. 
C. Conventional Approaches to Optimizing Patent Rights 
Academics and other experts in many fields have spent decades trying to 
understand where the sweet spot of patent protection lies in order to achieve the 
optimal level of net incentives to innovate in the domestic context. There have 
been many ambitious and creative attempts to solve this complex empirical 
problem. Past and ongoing efforts include advanced conceptual frameworks,70 
complex theoretical models,71 comparisons of innovation across jurisdictions 
with differing intellectual property protection,72 and studies of changes in 
                                                                                                                       
 
66
 NORDHAUS, supra note 52, at 78. 
 
67
 See Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 123 (2006) (“[I]ntellectual property grants are desirable to the extent that they 
encourage new product development at a reasonable cost.”). 
 
68
 Because innovation is a public good, even defining the socially optimal level of 
incentives to innovate is a complex task. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 53–57 (2012) (discussing challenges of pursuing 
optimality for public goods).  
 
69
 See B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 760 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) 
(noting in a comparable market context that “we believe that we would be quite unable to 
recognize an optimum if we saw one”). 
 
70
 E.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 23, at 319–50; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 
698; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 276–77 (1977); Merges & Nelson, supra note 52, at 840. 
 
71
 E.g., NORDHAUS, supra note 52, at 88–90; James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential 
Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. ECON. 611–14 (2009); Partha Dasgupta & 
Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 
(1980); Robert M. Hunt, Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation, 52 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 401 (2004). 
 
72
 E.g., ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE 
NETHERLANDS, 1869–1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907 (1971); Josh Lerner, 150 Years of 
Patent Protection, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 221 (2002); Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws 
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innovation due to changes in intellectual property laws over time.73 Though 
these approaches include many extraordinarily sophisticated endeavors, each 
has been unable to identify the optimal level of patent protection for at least one 
(and often multiple) of the following reasons: (1) they cannot sufficiently take 
into account all of the real world factors influencing innovation and 
incentives,74 (2) they cannot identify or control for the pertinent factors that 
influence innovation in real world studies,75 or (3) they consider only a limited 
area of innovation.76 Though we have learned much about innovation and 
patent law from these efforts, our understanding of the relationship between 
innovation and law remains frustratingly inconclusive.77  
                                                                                                                       
Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 
1214 (2005). 
 
73
 E.g., Abrams, supra note 43, at 1613; James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An 
Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007); Aaron S. 
Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1856 (2010); Moser, supra note 72, at 1216–17; Mark A. 
Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994); 
Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? 
Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77 (2001). 
 
74
 E.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 23, at 32–40 (discussing the difficulty and lack of 
information for evaluating the pioneer versus improver balance of rights in conceptual 
models); Abrams, supra note 43, at 1616–25 (discussing the difficulty of measuring 
innovation); Bessen & Maskin, supra note 71, at 614–19 (providing one of the most 
sophisticated economic models to date, but noting inaccurate assumptions that no firms own 
patents ex ante and that the social value of an invention is known); Peter S. Menell, A 
Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 489 
(2007) (providing a laundry list of some of the factors that would need to be taken into 
account in an economic model of optimizing patent protection). Simplifying assumptions 
are, in fact, one of the hallmarks and benefits of economic modeling. See COLIN F. 
CAMERER, WORLD CONG. OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 6 (2011), 
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/3XND-D35W. 
 
75
 E.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING 
THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 296 (2002) (noting difficulty with measuring or 
establishing the cause of innovation); SCHIFF, supra note 72, at 43, 51, 102–06 (noting 
problems with measuring innovation and with comparing real world studies across time or 
jurisdiction); G. M. PETER SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION: AN INTRODUCTION 35–
36 (2009) (describing limitations of various approaches to measuring innovation); Abrams, 
supra note 43, at 1615–19, 1640–41 (noting problems with evaluating exogenous effects on 
innovation and with the data used to measure innovation); Lerner, supra note 72, at 224 
(noting problems with data used to measure innovation). 
 
76
 E.g., Abrams, supra note 43, at 1640 (concentrating on the pharmaceutical industry); 
Kesselheim, supra note 73, at 1855 (same); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me in: 
Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 
MGMT. SCI. 804, 804 (2004) (semiconductor industry); Bessen & Hunt, supra note 73, at 
157 (software industry). 
 
77
 MERGES, supra note 30, at 2 (referring to balancing the costs and benefits of 
intellectual property as “impossibly complex”); Abrams, supra note 43, at 1641 
(“Understanding the incentive effects of patent protection is a core issue in intellectual 
property scholarship, about which almost nothing is currently known.”); Burk & Lemley, 
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The inability of existing analysis to resolve the relationship between 
intellectual property law and innovation is an almost necessary consequence of 
using conventional law and economics approaches to try to evaluate this 
interaction directly. Because the relationship between innovation and law is so 
complex and contextual, it is impossible to take all pertinent factors into 
account or to convey lessons from one situation and time to another.78 The 
approach developed here provides an alternate perspective to better investigate 
this long considered problem, developing different means to parse the 
seemingly insurmountable challenge of the complexity of the real world 
interaction between innovation and intellectual property law. Where most prior 
law and economics efforts take either a top-down approach to measuring social 
welfare or a bottom-up approach to sum private preferences, proxy signals 
provide a third way to conduct law and economics analysis. 
The proxy signal approach identifies states whose preferences are expected 
to structurally mirror the desired relationship between the beneficial incentives 
and exclusionary costs of patent law globally. These preferences are based on 
private and market information concerning the actual relationship between 
patent protection and innovation, information that cannot usually be captured. 
By aggregating the sum of private knowledge concerning this relationship and 
locating proxy signals concerning optimal trade-offs in patent law, this 
approach can move us closer than prior methods to maximizing global net 
incentives to innovate. Rather than succumbing to the impediment in much 
economic analysis of trying to fit an economic model to the complexity of the 
real world, the proxy technique takes advantage of real world variation as a 
signaling tool. The following sections present the proxy signal framework for 
using country preferences to signal globally favorable intellectual property 
incentive regimes. 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 19, at 1581 (“Rather than resolve the debate over how well the patent system 
works, . . . [legal and economic scholarship] has painted a more complex picture.”); Roberto 
Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of 
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1051 (1998) (conducting a literature review of patent 
analysis covering forty years and concluding, “[o]ur lack of knowledge here clearly limits 
our ability to analyze intelligently the current pressing issues of patent reform.”); George L. 
Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on 
Cheung, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19, 21 (1986) (“[I]n the current state of knowledge, economists 
know almost nothing about the effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other 
systems of intellectual property.”); FRITZ MACHLUP, STUDY OF THE U.S. SENATE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 79 (Comm. Print 1958) (“No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, 
could possibly state with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net 
benefit or a net loss upon society.”). 
 
78
 See MACHLUP, supra note 77, at 79–80 (“The best [any economist studying the 
patent system] can do is to state assumptions and make guesses about the extent to which 
reality corresponds to these assumptions.”). 
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D. Country Political Economy of Intellectual Property as a Proxy 
Decades of effort indicate that we cannot directly solve how to balance the 
trade-off between the incentive benefits and exclusivity costs of patent law. We 
may, however, be able to use proxy signals as an indirect method to decipher 
information about where the net incentives sweet spot lies. If it is possible to 
identify proxies that inherently (1) face similar trade-offs to the balance that 
would optimize net incentives for innovation globally, and (2) possess superior 
information concerning this relationship, then such proxies could signal optimal 
levels of patent protection. In the international intellectual property context, 
certain countries may be able to serve in this role. 
If we assume a well-functioning political environment, for initial purposes, 
country preferences for intellectual property rights should present an 
aggregation of private information and preferences for intellectual property 
protection.79 Country-level preferences should aggregate both domestic private 
industry preferences and domestic consumer interests.80 This preference 
aggregation will integrate both the domestic production interests and the 
domestic consumption interests in innovation. To the extent the political process 
functions well (admittedly a big “if,” discussed later in the paper), country 
preferences for intellectual property rights would thus collect vast private 
information concerning both the benefits from the incentives of patent 
protection and the costs of exclusivity produced by patent rights.81 These are 
precisely the factors that need to be balanced to determine how to optimize 
innovation and intellectual property rights, information that is not generally 
available to public policy makers.82 
Domestic production interests have both a domestic and a foreign 
component, as domestic industry can profit both from the sale of intellectual 
property products at home and their sale abroad. Domestic consumption 
interests similarly have both domestic and foreign components. The domestic 
consumption component reflects the exclusivity costs borne by domestic 
consumers due to intellectual property rights held by domestic producers, while 
the foreign component reflects the exclusivity costs borne by domestic 
                                                                                                                       
 
79
 See Brewster, supra note 28, at 4–5 (suggesting that in the context of the TRIPS 
agreement, states’ preferences reflect their combined institutions); Drahos, supra note 7, at 
771–72 (describing how the intellectual property rights afforded by TRIPS were 
significantly shaped by private sector preferences and interests); Grossman & Lai, supra 
note 9, at 1651 (concluding that a state’s optimal level of intellectual property protection is 
determined by aggregating the patent protection preferences of private firms). 
 
80
 See Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 416 (“[T]he domestic interests of countries’ 
innovators must be balanced against the interests of domestic consumers . . . .”). 
 
81
 See SELL, supra note 7, at 46–51 (noting the private sector’s “expertise and control 
over information” relating to innovation and the functioning of intellectual property rights). 
 
82
 See Drahos, supra note 7, at 772 (discussing how private industries often hold 
superior information concerning intellectual property rights than public entities, which often 
lack data). 
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consumers due to intellectual property rights held by foreign producers. These 
relationships are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Country-Level Intellectual Property Interests 
 
 Benefits of Incentives: 
Producer Interests 
Exclusivity Costs: 
Consumer Interests 
Domestic 
Component 
Profit from IP Rights in 
Domestic Market 
Cost of IP Rights held by 
Domestic Producers 
Foreign 
Component 
Profit from IP Rights in 
Foreign Markets 
Cost of IP Rights held by 
Foreign Producers 
 
From the perspective of country preferences for global intellectual property 
rights, the domestic production and domestic consumption components 
identified above will cancel each other out, as the amount that domestic 
innovators profit off of intellectual property rights in the domestic market is the 
same as the amount that domestic consumers pay for intellectual property rights 
in the domestic market. Consequently, the net interest that a country presents in 
the international context will be determined by the relationship between the 
foreign component of domestic intellectual property production interests (i.e., 
how much domestic producers profit from intellectual property rights in foreign 
markets) and the foreign component of domestic intellectual property 
consumption interests (i.e., how much domestic consumers pay due to 
intellectual property rights held by foreign producers). Country-level 
preferences and advocacy for intellectual property law in the international 
context should therefore reflect the relationship between the value of 
intellectual property products produced by domestic innovators to external 
markets versus the value of intellectual property products consumed by 
domestic consumers from external markets. This relationship between the value 
of intellectual property production versus the value of intellectual property 
consumption is equivalent to the relationship between the incentive benefits of 
intellectual property protection and the exclusivity costs of protection, precisely 
the relation we need to evaluate to determine where the optimal level of 
intellectual property protection lies.83 
These effects can be understood graphically. Figure 2 adds a pair of 
hypothetical country preference functions to the original net incentives function 
of Figure 1. Country A represents a country that is a heavy net producer of 
innovation products.  That is, the value of intellectual property products 
                                                                                                                       
 
83
 See Grossman & Lai, supra note 9, at 1646 (identifying the relationship between the 
value of intellectual property production and the value of intellectual property consumption 
as the dynamic that drives preferences for stronger or weaker patent protection); Maskus, 
supra note 18, at 2221–22 (noting the differential between production and consumption 
interests in intellectual property as the driving force of country intellectual property 
preferences). 
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produced to foreign markets by Country A exceeds the value of intellectual 
property products from abroad that are consumed by Country A. Because 
Country A is a net producer of intellectual property products, it can benefit from 
a stronger global patent rights regime to extract large monopoly profits, 
regardless of whether such patent protection levels increase net incentives to 
innovate globally. The generally technologically advanced Country A’s of the 
world face greater incentive benefits from stronger patent protection, and fewer 
exclusivity costs due to protection, than the point of optimal balance. This leads 
such countries, as a natural side-effect of their innovation trade imbalance, to 
advocate for stronger patent protection than will optimize net incentives 
globally.84 
 
Figure 2: Country Preferences for Intellectual Property Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversely, Country B represents a country that is a net consumer of 
innovation products. Here, the value of intellectual property products consumed 
domestically from foreign producers exceeds the value of intellectual property 
products produced domestically for foreign consumers. The Country B’s of the 
world face relatively fewer incentive benefits and higher exclusivity costs than 
the point of optimal balance, and will consequently favor weaker patent 
protection than the level that would optimize aggregate global incentives.85 
                                                                                                                       
 
84
 See Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 417 (using economic modeling to demonstrate that 
“more innovative countries will favor more extensive intellectual property rights than less 
innovative countries.”). 
 
85
 See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 9, at 635–37 (explaining that the lack of 
innovation in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector, combined with the great benefit of cheap 
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Country advocacy for intellectual property law will be self-interested, 
seeking to maximize the value of intellectual property rights for the particular 
country.86 Each country will advocate, in international negotiations and other 
fora, for a level of patent protection consistent with its own best interests.87 If, 
for example, strengthening patent protection would allow a heavy net-producer 
country to profit by generating greater foreign production gains from 
propertization than it suffers domestic consumer losses, such a country will 
favor stronger patent protection, regardless of whether greater propertization 
will expand or reduce aggregate global incentives to innovate. For these 
reasons, country advocacy concerning patent law generally will not provide a 
useful signal concerning the optimal level of patent protection for society 
globally. 
Some countries, however, may face domestic intellectual property trade-
offs that more closely mirror a balance between the production and 
consumption interests in innovation. Countries that consume about the same 
value of innovation from foreign producers as the value of innovation that 
domestic producers export to foreign consumers will be in this position. Such 
countries happen to internally balance the production-versus-consumption 
interests in intellectual property rights, and consequently will desire to balance 
the incentive-versus-exclusivity trade-offs in intellectual property law. This is 
the same balance that is necessary to optimize cumulative net incentives to 
innovate.  Country C in Figure 3 provides an example of a country that faces 
relatively balanced incentive-versus-exclusivity trade-offs from intellectual 
property protection. These structural trade characteristics will lead Country C to 
prefer more optimal levels of patent protection from a net incentives perspective 
than either Country A or Country B. This desire manifests not because Country 
C is altruistic, but as a side-effect of Country C’s particular innovation trade-
offs in the real world market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
pharmaceuticals for consumers, produces political pressure to aggressively challenge 
pharmaceutical patent protection from a domestic perspective). 
 
86
 SCOTCHMER, supra note 23, at 332–33; Maskus, supra note 18, at 2222. 
 
87
 The impact of social and public choice effects, and of psychological and behavioral 
heuristics, on whether countries actually advocate for their own best interests are discussed 
infra in Part III.B.2. 
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Figure 3: Country Preference and Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 reveals that the size of a country’s innovation market, whether 
production or consumption, is irrelevant to whether the country will tend to 
advocate for or against a socially preferable level of intellectual property 
protection.88 Rather, what matters is the relationship between the value of 
intellectual property products produced for foreign markets versus the value 
domestic consumers pay due to intellectual property rights held by foreigners.89 
As long as these two quantities are relatively balanced, a country will tend to 
naturally desire a balancing of the incentives and costs of patent protection, and 
consequently a globally beneficial level of patent rights. This will occur 
regardless of whether a country is a relatively small or relatively large producer 
or consumer of intellectual property products. 
Identifying countries that balance the production and consumption interests 
of intellectual property protection can yield powerful results. Even though we 
                                                                                                                       
 
88
 Compare Grossman & Lai, supra note 9, at 1646 (concluding based on an economic 
model that country size does not have a per se effect upon preferences with intellectual 
property rights, but that “[t]he role of market size in generating different incentives for the 
governments has to do . . . with the relative effectiveness of the countries’ policy 
instruments”), with Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 417 (concluding based on an economic 
model that “small countries will favor more extensive intellectual property rights than large 
countries”).  The difference between the analysis here and Scotchmer’s work is that 
Scotchmer holds “innovativeness” across large and small countries constant in reaching her 
conclusion, while the analysis here identifies particular countries that balance their 
production and consumption interests in intellectual property (i.e., it does not hold 
innovativeness constant across countries, but searches for countries that match the value of 
innovativeness production to the value of innovativeness consumption). 
 
89
 Scotchmer, supra note 12, at 416. 
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may not be able to directly identify the optimal level of intellectual property 
protection to maximize net incentives to innovate, we may instead be able to 
identify a proxy that mirrors the desired relationship to balance incentives and 
exclusivity. Because the identified proxy will tend to desire the same level of 
propertization for self-interested reasons as is desired globally to optimize net 
incentives to innovate overall, proxy advocacy can produce valuable patent law 
signals. 
E. Country Versus Industry Proxy Signals 
In prior work that developed the proxy signal concept for domestic patent 
law, the proposed proxy signals were based on identifying particular industry 
preferences, not country preferences.90 Such industries were selected based on a 
number of technology, industry, and market characteristics in an effort to 
identify industries that would inherently desire a balance in the incentive 
benefits and exclusivity costs of patent law.91 These industries would then be 
expected to advocate for domestic patent law that properly balanced the trade-
off between incentives and limitations on access.92 
The level of patent protection that is beneficial for a particular industry at 
the domestic level, however, does not signal the international level of patent 
protection that would optimize net incentives to innovate globally. Industries do 
not function well as proxies for global patent objectives because unaccounted 
for cross-border trade effects create innovation externalities. An industry that 
profits heavily from intellectual property rights abroad, for example, may not 
face any internal costs from such external intellectual property protection. 
Country proxy signals, however, can serve the net incentives goal. To the extent 
countries accurately agglomerate private industry and private consumer 
interests, they reflect the relationship between the production and consumption 
of innovation within that country. 
Country-level proxy analysis is also more practical in the international 
patent law context because countries are the traditional intellectual property 
actors internationally. An additional potentially valuable advantage of countries 
as proxies is that countries can aggregate a far broader spectrum of information 
than a single industry. Countries admittedly, however, will not be perfect 
proxies. Countries and industries both face agency concerns in selecting 
preferences, though the challenges for countries may be greater. Agency 
problems arise for industries as proxies because individuals within firms may 
act in their own best interests, rather than in the firm’s best interests.93 Using 
                                                                                                                       
 
90
 Mandel, supra note 20, at 1. 
 
91
 Id. at 33–40. 
 
92
 Id. at 34. 
 
93
 See V.V. Chari, Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, Prizes and Patents: Using 
Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations, 147 J. ECON. THEORY 781, 783 (2012) 
(describing hidden buybacks in the patent system as a way in which the preferences of 
individuals in an organization can drive the actions of a firm); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
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countries as proxies raises not only these concerns,94 but also a host of public 
choice and capture challenges95 that may lead country advocacy concerning 
international patent law not to accurately reflect the aggregation of domestic 
production and domestic consumption interests in patent protection.96 Further, 
countries may identify flexibilities under international law that allow them to 
treat different industries within the country differently, enabling such countries 
to favor patent production interests in certain industries that are active 
innovators within the country while favoring patent consumption interests in 
other industries where most innovation is imported from abroad.97   
Using country preferences as proxy signals to improve global incentives to 
innovate is thus a promising avenue, but there are significant challenges. The 
following Part provides greater detail concerning how proxy signal analysis can 
be applied and explains how questions concerning the use of country advocacy 
as a proxy signal can be ameliorated. 
                                                                                                                       
Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 775–77 
(discussing the paradoxical nature of corporate law and the negative consequences when 
individuals go against the dictate of corporate law to set aside their best interest in favor of 
the firm); Brayden G. King, Teppo Felin & David A. Whetten, Perspective—Finding the 
Organization in Organizational Theory: A Meta-Theory of the Organization as a Social 
Actor, 21 ORG. SCI. 290, 292–93 (2010) (using organizational theory to characterize 
organizations as individuals whose interests drive organizational level choices). But cf. 
Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 
ECONOMICA 1, 2–3 (2010) (arguing that most people, even in a corporate capacity, are driven 
by genuine altruism and the desire to do good).  
 
94
 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 28 (1957) (arguing that 
politicians “act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from 
being in office”); Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup d’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291, 
309–12 (2012) (discussing the body of literature supporting the theory that politicians largely 
act in their own self-interest). 
 
95
 See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 298 (2008) (discussing the problems of public choice 
and regulatory capture); DOWNS, supra note 94, at 28 (identifying certain public choice 
issues with respect to political representation and politician’s interests); Robert W. McGee, 
Legal Ethics, Business Ethics and International Trade: Some Neglected Issues, 10 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109, 115–17, 125–26, 194  (2002) (discussing various manifestations of 
public choice problems). 
 
96
 Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National 
Study, 26 RES. POL’Y 283, 290 (1997) (indicating that countries do not always act in their 
own best interests due to particular trade or specific industry interests); Phillip McCalman, 
National Patents, Innovation and International Agreements, 11 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. 
DEV. 1, 3–4 (2002) (examining the presence of externalities produced by patent agreements 
that may lead countries not to act in their own best interests); Stephen Yelderman, 
International Cooperation and the Patent-Antitrust Intersection, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
193, 211–12 (2011) (citing the factors in international coordinated patent policy in which 
nations might opt for patent protection even when free riding is in their best interest).  
 
97
 See, e.g., Salama & Benoliel, supra note 9, at 637 (discussing Brazil’s use of TRIPS 
flexibilities to apply differing levels of patent protection to pharmaceuticals versus other 
technologies). 
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IV. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL PROXY SIGNALS 
Applying country advocacy as a proxy signal in real world context presents 
a number of challenges and questions. Utilizing existing international trade 
data, the first section of this Part demonstrates in greater detail how country 
proxy signaling could work, and discusses further data that could be developed. 
The latter sections flesh out a number of details and respond to likely questions 
about the proxy approach, including consideration of how proxy analysis can 
function dynamically, how to measure country preferences, and the potential to 
differentiate patent law across different industries. 
A. Measuring Intellectual Property Production and Consumption 
The proxy methodology developed here relies on comparing the value of 
patent protection derived by intellectual property producers within a given 
country from foreign markets against the cost of patent protection incurred by 
intellectual property consumers within the same country due to foreign 
intellectual property producers. Though these valuations cannot be measured 
exactly, rough approximation can yield valuable information that has never 
been captured or utilized before.  
The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade) database is the 
leading source of data on international imports and exports.98 Comtrade 
provides commodity trade flow data for over 140 countries in the United 
Nations, including both import cost and export valuation at the customs frontier 
of the given country.99 The commodities and export/import data are divided by 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) code, allowing 
                                                                                                                       
 
98
 Guillaume Gaulier & Soledad Zignago, BACI: International Trade Database at the 
Product-Level, the 1994–2007 Version 7 (Centre D’Etudes Prospective et D’Informations 
Internationales, Working Paper No. 2010-23, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1994500 (referring to Comtrade as “the most comprehensive 
database on world trade”); Sunil Mani, Exports of High Technology Products from 
Developing Countries: Is it Real or Statistical Artifact?, at 16 n.4 (United Nations 
University Intech Institute for New Technologies, Discussion Paper Series No. 2001-1, 
2000) (describing Comtrade as “by far the most comprehensive source of trade statistics”). 
 
99
 James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, Trade Costs 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10480, May 2004); U.N. Comtrade Database, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://comtrade.un.org/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/WAX8-A9BC. Comtrade provides both import and export valuation data, 
and “re-import” and “re-export” valuation data where such data has been provided by a 
country.  Id.  Re-imports refers to situations where a country exports a product, and then 
imports the same particular product, for example as a component of a now manufactured 
machine.  Id.  Re-exports refer to the converse: where a country imports a foreign good and 
then exports it.  Id. For purposes of analysis here, re-imports are incorporated into a 
country’s imports and re-exports are incorporated into a country’s exports, as this treatment 
aligns the country’s interest in paying for or profiting from the product with the direction of 
the incentives that are the target of proxy analysis.  
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differentiation of trade flow information by country across thousands of 
different product categories. 
Gross import and export data is not useful for intellectual property law 
proxy analysis. What we need for proxy signals for international intellectual 
property law is not data on all imports and exports, but information on trade 
flow value that derives from intellectual property rights protection. A 
commonly used surrogate for this innovation value is data on trade flow in 
products with the highest research and development intensity.100 Research and 
development intensity measures the proportion of a product’s value that derives 
from research and development activity, and is calculated by dividing the 
research and development expense to produce a given product by the product’s 
total sales value.101 Research and development intensity thus provides a useful 
measure for identifying those products that derive the highest proportion of their 
value from innovation activity.102 
Using research and development intensity to identify products that derive 
the highest proportion of their value from innovation is not a perfect surrogate 
for products that derive the highest proportion of their value from patent 
protection. This is both because innovation value can be secured through means 
other than patent protection, and because there may be product value created by 
non-patented aspects of a high research intensity product’s development.103 For 
the purposes of introducing proxy analysis, however, the research and 
development intensity measure should do a reasonable job of identifying those 
products that benefit the most in value from patent protection,104 and therefore 
are the most important products for trade flow purposes for proxy signal 
                                                                                                                       
 
100
 Benoît Godin, The Obsession for Competitiveness and its Impact on Statistics: The 
Construction of High-Technology Indicators, 33 RES. POL’Y 1217, 1219–21 (2004) 
(describing the development of the use of research and development intensity as a surrogate 
for data on high-technology trade); Michael J. Ferrantino, Robert B. Koopman, Zhi Wang & 
Falan Yinug, The Nature of US-China Trade in Advanced Technology Products, 52 COMP. 
ECON. STUD. 207, 210 (2010) (indicating the use of research and development as a proxy for 
the technology in a product).   
 
101
 Godin, supra note 100, at 1218 (defining this research and development indicator 
ratio). 
 
102
 Mani, supra note 98, at 29 (utilizing the OECD definition of high-tech (high research 
intensity) products for Comtrade data and stating that such products involve the greatest 
product innovation); Louis Raymond & Josée St-Pierre, R&D as a Determinant of 
Innovation in Manufacturing SMEs: An Attempt at Empirical Clarification, 30 
TECHNOVATION 48, 49 (2010) (noting that product innovation plays the greatest role in high 
research intensity sectors). 
 
103
 See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent 
(or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (presenting 
survey data on why firms in different industries patent and how they derive value from their 
intellectual creations). 
 
104
 Mani, supra note 98, at 9 (using research and development intensity to measure 
innovation value of exports in this regard). 
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analysis. As discussed below, this data could be further refined for future 
analyses. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has identified the sixty-two product categories out of over 3,000 SITC product 
categories that display very high research intensity ratios.105 These high 
research intensity products range from semiconductors to optical equipment to 
pharmaceuticals.106 
In order to provide a proof-of-concept test for proxy signal analysis, I 
selected eleven countries at different stages of technological development and 
collected Comtrade import and export data for these countries for all sixty-two 
high research intensity data categories for 2012, the latest full year of available 
data. The countries selected were: Brazil, China, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Ukraine, and the 
United States.107 The countries purposely include a range of developing, BRIC, 
and highly technologically-advanced economies. 
The results of the Comtrade high research intensity product analysis are 
reported in Table 2. The first two columns for each country display that 
country’s total high-intensity product exports and imports for 2012, in millions 
of dollars.  Column (c) is the difference between Column (a) and Column (b), 
essentially a country’s trade surplus (if positive) or deficit (if negative) in high 
research intensity products for 2012. Absolute trade differentials are not very 
useful for proxy signal analysis. A country could have a very low trade 
differential simply because it does not import or export many high research 
intensity products. Such a country, however, likely would not care significantly 
about the level of patent protection, and therefore would not serve as a useful 
proxy. More important than absolute trade differential statistics for identifying 
countries for proxy analysis is the ratio of a country’s high research intensity 
trade differential relative to its total trade volume in such products. This statistic 
is reported in Column (d). Countries with a low trade differential ratio will tend 
to have reasonably balanced interests in the import and export of high research 
intensity products, precisely the relationship desired for proxy signal analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
105
 Anderson & van Wincoop, supra note 99, at 6; EUROSTAT, HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS 
(2014), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an4.pdf; 
U.N. Comtrade Database, supra note 99. Standard International Trade Classification Rev. 3, 
which was used for this paper’s analysis, has 3,118 basic headings and subheadings, which 
are organized into 261 groups, 67 divisions and 10 sections. Id.  
 
106
 U.N. Comtrade Database, supra note 99; Mani, supra note 98, at 15 n.3 (citing some 
of the products U.N. Comtrade covers). 
 
107
 Kenya and Nigeria were originally included in the list of countries, but had to be 
removed as data had been reported for only a small portion of the product categories for each 
country. 
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Table 2. High Research Intensity Imports and Exports in Millions of U.S 
Dollars (2012)108 
 
 High 
Research 
Intensity 
Exports 
(a) 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Imports 
(b) 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Trade 
Differential 
(c) 
Differential 
/ (Exports + 
Imports) 
(d) 
Brazil 9,778 35,418 -25,640 -0.5673 
China 610,352 610,248 104 0.0001 
Germany 201,334 163,282 38,052 0.1044 
India 11,792 34,146 -22,354 -0.4866 
Indonesia 7,727 26,543 -18,816 -0.5490 
Japan 139,590 129,364 10,226 0.0380 
Malaysia 64,958 56,756 8,201 0.0674 
Mexico  53,840 104,291 -50,451 -0.3190 
South Africa 2,375 11,208 -8,832 -0.6503 
South Korea 140,039 83,436 56,604 0.2533 
Spain 13,631 24,866 -11,235 -0.2918 
Ukraine 2,825 6,072 -3,247 -0.3649 
USA  310,933 396,591 -85,659 -0.1211 
 
As revealed in Table 2, of the eleven countries selected for analysis here, 
China, Japan, and Malaysia all display relatively balanced relationships between 
the value of high research intensity products exported and high research 
                                                                                                                       
 
108
 U.N. Comtrade Database, supra note 99.   
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intensity products imported. Such countries will tend to have relatively balanced 
interests between promoting the incentives of patent protection and guarding 
against the exclusionary costs that patent protection creates. Proxy analysis thus 
indicates that these countries, acting in their own best interests, should care very 
strongly about setting international patent protection at a level that will optimize 
global incentives to innovate. 
The appearance of China on this list will undoubtedly surprise some, and 
could be due to some of the restrictions inherent in the current Comtrade data, 
which are discussed further below.109 That said, despite China’s historic 
reputation as a reluctant supporter of intellectual property rights, China’s 
economy has been shifting towards greater innovation,110 a shift reflected in the 
statistics reported in Table 2. As others have already noted, this shift towards 
greater innovation appears to be leading China to support stronger patent 
protection laws and enforcement than it had previously,111 precisely as the 
proxy approach would predict. 
Other interesting results can be gleaned from the data reported in Table 2.  
For example, Brazil and Indonesia possess the two greatest high research 
intensity trade deficits of the eleven countries analyzed here. This indicates that 
such countries tend to pay substantial exclusionary costs due to patent 
protection, while garnering relatively few beneficial incentives. Consistent with 
this result, Brazil and Indonesia have generally favored weaker intellectual 
property rights laws.112 
Though the Comtrade data is valuable for proxy signal analysis, more 
precise data could be developed. First, the Comtrade data is based on import 
and export value at the customs frontier, but does not identify the nationality of 
the entity that derives value from such trades. Where a domestic firm exports 
intellectual property products from a foreign country in which it operates, such 
value will appear in the Comtrade database as attached to the foreign country 
even though the reality is that the intellectual property value is spread across 
both countries. In many cases, publically available data concerning firm 
ownership and operation could be used to make such calculations more 
precisely. 
                                                                                                                       
 
109
 In addition, the reliability of certain of China’s economic statistics has been 
questioned in other contexts. Derek Scissors, How to Make China More Honest, 
BACKGROUNDER, No. 2839, Sept. 4, 2013, at 1, available at 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/bg2839.pdf. As discussed below, because all 
imports and exports require two party interaction, it would be highly feasible to introduce an 
audit mechanism into proxy signal analysis were this framework to be implemented.  See 
infra Part III.B.1. 
 
110
 See Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and its Undetermined 
Future, 2009 WIPO J. 1, 12. 
 
111
 See id. at 12–13; Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First 
Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1124  
(2009); Yu, Cultural Relics, supra note 1, at 504. 
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Second, as noted above, there is not a perfect correlation between high 
research intensity products (the data that Comtrade provides) and products that 
derive the greatest value from innovation (the data desired for proxy signal 
analysis).113 In order to conduct more precise analysis, the OECD high-
technology product categories could be differentiated based on the proportion of 
a product’s value that derives from patent protection, and the product categories 
could be weighted according to these proportions. Summing high-technology 
import and export valuations in this manner would provide a more accurate 
picture of which countries face the closest balance between the net amount that 
they profit from patent protection versus the net cost incurred as a result of 
protection. 
B. Proxy Signal Challenges 
Though the Comtrade data and analysis represents a good start, application 
of proxy signal analysis to the actual political economy of international 
intellectual property presents a number of hurdles. This section fleshes out 
several details concerning how proxy analysis could function in practice and 
responds to likely questions about the new approach. These sections explain 
how proxy analysis can function dynamically to respond to the continual 
evolution in intellectual property markets, how to address country proxy signal 
measurement and selection challenges, the potential to differentiate patent law 
across different industries under a proxy signal paradigm, and other matters. 
1. Dynamic Proxy Signals 
The relationship between the production and consumption of intellectual 
property goods and services within any given state will continually evolve as a 
result of technological innovation and market forces. Proxy analysis indicates 
that as countries become greater net producers or heavier net consumers of 
intellectual property products, their preferences and advocacy for given levels 
of intellectual property protection will evolve concurrently. Historical evidence 
supports this inference. For example, though the United Kingdom is currently a 
strong proponent of patent protection, for a significant part of the twentieth 
century the United Kingdom excluded chemical products from patent protection 
or enabled compulsory licensing for them in an effort to protect a domestic 
chemical industry that lagged behind foreign producers of chemical product 
innovation.114 Similarly, during most of the nineteenth century, Japan was a 
well-known intellectual property pirate and the United States a well-known 
copyright pirate, each at times when they were net importers of intellectual 
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property products developed abroad.115 An era of rapid technological 
development over the past several decades has led South Korea to shift 
advocacy positions from being a weak enforcer of intellectual property rights to 
a proponent of stronger protection.116 For similar reasons, and as partially 
discussed above, while both China and India have generally opposed 
strengthening intellectual property rights, each economy is now witnessing 
innovative sectors emerge.117 This shift towards greater innovation production 
appears to be leading China and India to moderate their positions on patent 
protection, at least in certain regards.118 
As the relationship between the production of intellectual property products 
to foreign markets and consumption from foreign markets within a country 
changes, the country’s significance and utility as a proxy signal will change as 
well. A change in the relationship between the production and consumption of 
intellectual property products within a country will cause the country’s 
preferences for a given level of patent protection, and the country’s advocacy in 
international dialogue, to evolve. As a country moves closer towards a balance 
between the production and consumption of intellectual property products, it 
will become a more accurate proxy signal; if the relationship between 
production and consumption becomes less equal, the country will be less useful 
as a proxy signal. 
                                                                                                                       
 
115
 William W. Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum—ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die 
Geschichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten [The Growth of Intellectual 
Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States], in EIGENTUM IM 
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265, 265–91 (Hannes Siegrist & David Sugarmann eds., 
1999) (Ger.), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf; B. 
Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of 
Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 234–37 
(2001); Geoffrey R. Scott, A Comparative View of Copyright As Cultural Property in Japan 
and the United States, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 283, 330 (2006). The United States did 
not join the Berne Convention, granting reciprocal copyright protection to nationals of other 
signatories, until 1989. Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886 
Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 172–77 (1989); Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. 
Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 311, 315–18, 322–32 (2010). 
 
116
 Ruth Taplin, Protect and Survive: Managing Intellectual Property in the Far East—
The Case of South Korea, KNOWLEDGELINK NEWSL. (Thomson Scientific), Nov. 2004, at 1–
2; Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on 
Intellectual Property Laws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118, 119–22 (1994). 
 
117
 Yu, supra note 110, at 12; Roger Bate, India and the Drug Patent Wars, HEALTH 
POLICY OUTLOOK, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. 1 (Feb. 2007), available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2007/02/07/20070207_200702HPOg.pdf. 
 
118
 Yu, supra note 110, at 12–13; Reichman, supra note 111, at 1124; Yu, Middle 
Intellectual Property Powers, supra note 1, at 504. 
766 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:4 
 
Proxy signal analysis can operate dynamically to continually respond to 
changing intellectual property activity and advocacy.119 By reexamining 
country production to foreign markets versus consumption from foreign markets 
on a regular basis, and regularly reevaluating the advocacy positions of any 
countries determined to present accurate incentive versus trade-off balances, 
proxy analysis can not only maintain a proper target for intellectual property 
rights, but also prevent countries from being able to game the system for their 
own self-interest.   
So long as we are able to select accurate proxy countries, and move away 
from using them once they no longer offer appropriate interest balancing, then 
proxy country preferences will reflect the level of patent protection that 
optimizes net incentives to innovate globally. Further, because proxy signal 
analysis is based on identifying countries whose interests align with society’s 
interest in optimizing incentives to innovate, there would be little reason for any 
selected country to try to strategically game its advocacy. Certainly, countries 
that do not present balanced production versus consumption trade-offs will try 
to argue that they do possess such balance and may try to massage their trade 
data to indicate greater balance than they actually have. As discussed above, 
however, we already have significant external information available concerning 
these relationships, and there are additional data sources that could be 
developed.  In addition, because the relationship between a country’s foreign 
production and imported consumption of innovation is represented in the export 
and import of intellectual property products, such data necessarily involves an 
external trading partner in each case, which can be used to verify the 
information. This relationship makes it reasonably feasible to set up an audit 
mechanism for trade data that could make it difficult for countries to be 
deceptive concerning their individual relationship between intellectual property 
imports and exports. Though the proxy signal methodology may not be simple, 
it is a far easier task to measure country-level import and export of intellectual 
property goods than it is to try to directly evaluate all of the incentive benefits 
and exclusivity costs produced by a given level of intellectual property 
protection.   
2. Measuring Country Preferences 
The proxy signals methodology relies on two streams of information: the 
relationship between the production and consumption of intellectual property 
products by country and country intellectual property rights preferences. Both 
types of information present challenges for measurement and evaluation.120 The 
former was discussed above, the latter is examined here. 
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Proxy analysis relies on countries being able to accurately evaluate and 
advocate for an aggregation of their domestic production and consumption 
interests. Even in a well-functioning political environment, it is not realistic to 
expect that this process will function precisely. A variety of agency problems 
produced by special interest pressure and lobbying, agency capture, and other 
political failures can lead states not to act in their own best interests.121 For 
example, large firms may exercise their political strength to promote overly-
protectionist intellectual property regimes that protect established firms against 
small and start-up companies, even though such regimes may lead to less 
innovation overall.122 Similarly, in many contexts the diffuse consumer interest 
in weaker intellectual property rights may be overcome by the more 
concentrated production interest that industry may have in greater 
propertization.123 That said, intellectual property consumers and their advocates 
have demonstrated significant and increasing strength over the past decade and 
have mobilized collective-action efforts to push back against what has been 
viewed as untoward expansion of intellectual property rights.124 These 
initiatives have had a substantial effect in international intellectual property law, 
including revisions to TRIPS and the defeat of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA).125 
In certain circumstances, even countries with well-functioning political 
systems may not accurately understand their own preferences or what legal 
rules will be in their own best interests. Robert Hudec provided one of the most 
in-depth studies of the effects of preferential trade policies on developing 
country economies under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
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in general.126 Hudec concludes that developing states’ successful advocacy for 
preferential treatment actually disserved their economic interests.127 This 
occurred because states that received the greatest preferential treatment did not 
diversify their exports or create new trade.128 In other words, states’ successful 
pursuit of preferential treatment achieved short-term benefits at the expense of 
long-term development.129 Developed countries can be subject to 
miscalculations concerning their own best interests as well. The bounded 
rationality of human decision-making, for example, means that even individuals 
seeking to act in a state’s best interests still may not be able to do so.130 
Despite these hurdles, proxy analysis can still yield highly valuable 
information. The question is not whether we can conduct proxy analysis 
precisely, but whether we can achieve a rough approximation that is beneficial 
relative to current methods for trying to balance the incentive-versus-exclusivity 
effects of intellectual property rights. Given that we currently lack any 
grounded model for directly measuring this relationship,131 this concern is quite 
feasible to overcome. Even with the limitations noted above, state actors 
commonly still act on the basis of substantial information about industry and 
consumer interests within their jurisdictions, information that generally is not 
captured when analyzing overall incentives for innovation. Providing a 
mechanism for capturing the pertinent content of that information means that 
proxy analysis along the lines discussed here can yield new and valuable 
information about optimizing global incentives to innovate.  
Proxy signals can be further strengthened by integrating results across 
multiple countries. No individual country will present a perfect proxy and it is 
likely that any particular country’s signal will not be precise. Multiple countries, 
however, are likely to present proxies that approximate the desired balance 
between production and consumption interests in intellectual property rights. By 
aggregating proxy signals across several countries that appear to present the 
strongest production-versus-consumption balances, we can reduce the 
likelihood that problematic political processes or misinformation from any 
single country is biasing the overall results.132 Aggregating multiple country 
preferences in this manner will reduce the unsystematic variation in proxy 
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signals that may arise due to errors in the underlying data or in countries 
identifying their own true preferences. 
In addition, as noted above, the proxy signal framework is based on a one-
dimensional representation of patent law strength even though actual patent law 
can be strengthened or weakened along multiple dimensions.133 Aggregating 
proxy signals across several countries will help ameliorate any distortion 
introduced by this simplification. Though the final calculation may not be 
perfect, it should be far superior and based on much greater information than 
any other methodology that is currently available for trying to optimally 
promote innovation through patent protection. 
3. Industry-Specific Patent Law 
An added benefit of proxy analysis is that it may provide a framework to 
develop industry-specific patent law. It is well-recognized that the optimal level 
of intellectual property protection varies for different industries.134 For 
example, the level of patent propertization that would balance the trade-off 
between incentives and exclusivity in the pharmaceutical sector is almost 
certainly different from the level of propertization that would balance trade-offs 
in the software industry.135 
Domestic patent law, however, generally takes a one-size-fits-all approach 
to patent protection,136 and international law has followed suit.  Prior to TRIPS, 
the most technologically advanced countries had already instituted largely 
uniform patent laws across various industries. The same patent law generally 
applies whether one seeks a patent on a better mousetrap, component of a cell 
phone, or new nanobiotechnological process.137 Many less developed countries, 
however, differentiated patent rights by industry prior to the promulgation of 
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TRIPS.138 India, Brazil, and additional countries, for example, excluded 
pharmaceutical products and processes from patent eligibility in the 1970s and 
1980s.139 
The TRIPS agreement is the leading international agreement on intellectual 
property rights, and it substantially reduced such industry differentiation in 
patent law. TRIPS mandates certain requirements for the intellectual property 
laws of the 160 states that are members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).140 TRIPS obliges WTO members to provide particular patent, 
copyright, trademark, and other intellectual property rights to nationals of other 
WTO members.141 In the patent context, TRIPS requires that member states 
grant patents on inventions, whether products or processes, in all “fields of 
technology,” provided the inventions meet other patentability requirements.142 
There are exceptions, notably for certain public interests.143 Though TRIPS 
technically, in general, only requires minimum levels of intellectual property 
protection, in practice it has been used by the most technologically advanced 
countries to press for stronger substantive intellectual property rights almost 
across the board.144 
The TRIPS agreement has been criticized for promoting this one-size-fits-
all approach to patent law.145 For example, contrary to the variation in 
patentability across industries that used to exist in India, Brazil, and other 
developing countries, TRIPS includes specific provisions requiring protection 
of pharmaceuticals, bioengineered microorganisms, and computer software.146 
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Subsequent to joining TRIPS, most countries have instituted relatively uniform 
patent laws across technological fields and industries.147 The harmonization of 
patent law across various industries is a problem for trying to achieve optimal 
incentives to innovate. 
The country proxy signal approach introduced here could be used to 
identify optimal patent propertization levels that vary by industry. Rather than 
searching for countries that balance the production-versus-consumption of 
patent rights across all intellectual property product exports and imports 
collectively, one instead could search for countries that balance production 
versus consumption interests in intellectual property products in a particular 
industry. Such countries would have self-interested incentives to prefer a level 
of patent protection that optimizes net incentives to innovate for that particular 
industry, in the same manner as described above across all industries.148 
Industry level proxy signal analysis may be easier to achieve than the overall 
proxy approach because it is easier to compare production versus consumption 
in a single specific industry, rather than across all industries significantly 
affected by patent protection. For example, research and development intensity, 
product definitions and groupings, and the ability to measure trade data will all 
tend to be more consistent within a single industry than across multiple 
industries. 
The existing United Nations Comtrade data makes it relatively 
straightforward to differentiate trade flow data by industry. Using SITC codes, 
Comtrade divides high-intensity research import and export trade data across 
nine sectors: Aerospace, Computers and Office Machines, Electronics and 
Telecommunications, Pharmacy, Scientific Instruments, Electronic Machinery, 
Non-Electronic Machinery, Chemistry, and Armament.149 I used the Comtrade 
database to analyze imports and exports in each of these sectors, similar to the 
analysis conducted above for all imports and exports combined.150 The results 
of this analysis are reported in the Article’s Appendix for the three largest 
sectors based on international trade value (Electronics and Telecommunications, 
Computers and Office Machines, and Scientific Instruments), as well as for 
Pharmacy, given the particularly vociferous debates over international 
intellectual property law as it relates to pharmaceuticals.151 
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The sector analysis reveals, unsurprisingly, that different countries should 
serve as intellectual property proxies for different sectors. For example, 
Germany, Japan, and Malaysia all display a relatively balanced trade flow in the 
Electronics and Telecommunications sector.152 It is likely, therefore, that such 
countries’ intellectual property preferences in this sector would be to optimize 
overall incentives to innovate, as opposed to being biased strongly in the 
direction of either excessive exclusionary rights or freeing access to the point 
that it harms innovation. Were we to try to set intellectual property rights 
differently by sector, in an effort to optimize incentives to innovate in each 
sector, Germany, Japan, and Malaysia appear to be promising candidates for 
further study in electronics and telecommunications, at least from among the 
eleven countries studied here. 
In other sectors, different countries are more promising candidates to 
identify preferences that may balance patent law’s benefits of incentives against 
the costs of exclusivity. In Computers and Office Machines, South Korea stands 
out as the country closest to demonstrating a balance between high-intensity 
research product imports and exports,153 while in Scientific Instruments, the 
United States is by far the most balanced country.154 Each country’s intellectual 
property preferences, in these particular fields, could present a reasonable place 
to start in trying to understand how to balance the benefits and costs of 
intellectual property protection in these sectors.155 Finally, in the Pharmacy 
sector, Germany, Spain, and the United States display relatively close 
correspondence between high-intensity research product imports and exports, 
indicating that their preferences would align with intellectual property law that 
best supports the greatest incentives to innovate.156 
Of course, intellectual property law could be parsed even further. The 
Comtrade database Electronics and Telecommunications sector, for example, 
includes semiconductors, electronic integrated circuits, video and sound 
recording devices, and optical fiber cables.157 These are different industries, and 
each may benefit from different intellectual property laws. The Comtrade 
                                                                                                                       
countries studied here), Computers and Office Machines ($342 billion in exports and $276 
billion in imports), and Scientific Instruments ($253 billion in exports and $256 billion in 
imports) were each more than twice as much as any export or import values for any of the 
other high research intensity sectors.  U.N. Comtrade Database, supra note 108.  Pharmacy 
totals were $41 billion in exports and $49 billion in imports across the 11 countries.  Id. 
 
152
 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
 
153
 See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
 
154
 See infra Appendix, Table 5. 
 
155
 Note that simply because a country has incentives for balanced preferences in a given 
industry does not mean that the country has optimal patent law for that industry. As 
discussed, domestic patent law is not industry specific, precluding countries from optimizing 
incentives to innovate even in industries where they may have strong incentives to do so. See 
supra pp. 769–70. 
 
156
 See infra Appendix, Table 6. 
 
157
 EUROSTAT, HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS (2014), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ 
ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an4.pdf. 
2014] LEVERAGING THE INT’L ECONOMY OF IP 773 
 
database would permit such differentiation. For example, in semiconductors, 
South Korea happens to display a very close match between the value of 
semiconductors that it imports ($4.49 billion) versus the value of 
semiconductors that it exports ($4.86 billion).158 South Korea would therefore 
have self-interested incentives in the semiconductor industry to seek a level of 
patent protection that would optimize overall incentives to innovate in the 
industry. As noted above, this initial analysis is admittedly relatively rough, 
designed primarily to show how proxy analysis can work, not to provide 
definitive conclusions in any area of law. 
One of the primary critiques of industry-specific patent law is a concern that 
it would create an increased opportunity for industry rent-seeking by enabling 
industries to lobby for industry-favorable patent laws at the expense of 
consumers.159 In the current one-size-fits-all intellectual property context, 
powerful industries line up on both sides of patent debates, curtailing their 
ability to rent-seek at the expense of diffuse consumer interests.160 Were patent 
to vary by industry, however, without any objective basis for differentiation, 
there is a significant fear that there would no longer be cross-industry checks on 
problematic laws, leading to separate producer-biased law in every industry.161 
Proxy signal analysis provides a way beyond this industry-specific patent law 
concern by presenting objective means to identify the appropriate level of 
propertization within each industry. Proxy analysis thus presents a technique to 
effectively differentiate private patent law preferences that arise from a desire 
for greater rent-seeking (which society wants to avoid) from those that are 
based on a desire to actually increase incentives to innovate (which society 
should want to foster globally).  
V. CONCLUSION 
The country-based proxy approach introduced here is based on a more 
holistic and internationally communitarian approach to intellectual property 
rights and innovation than is common in the existing international political 
economy. Most current advocacy and policy analysis of international 
intellectual property debates concerns zero-sum negotiations, pitting 
technologically advanced countries against the BRICs and other technologically 
developing countries over the strength of intellectual property rights, trade 
relations, and foreign investment. Few parties attend to what should be the 
central issue in intellectual property law: how to optimize net incentives to 
innovate. 
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This vacuity is ironic in the international arena. Treaties can only be 
achieved if they are perceived as producing benefits by all parties. Such benefits 
cannot be produced simply by shifting profit flows from one country to another, 
but they can be created by real efficiency gains in the form of intellectual 
property laws that increase aggregate incentives to innovate at the global 
level.162 Despite the well-recognized import of optimizing incentives to 
innovate at the domestic level, this goal has been largely ignored 
internationally. One reason for the lack of attention has been the apparent 
indeterminacy of understanding how to improve net incentives to innovate. 
While the United States, European Union countries, Japan, and others argue that 
strengthening rights will achieve greater incentives, many developing countries 
argue they will not, and neither side has reliable empirical evidence with which 
to support its case. Proxy signal analysis offers a novel means out of such 
loggerheads to advance the elusive goal of optimally promoting incentives to 
innovate globally, an objective that could benefit all. 
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APPENDIX 
High Research Intensity Imports and Exports for Selected Industries (2012). 
 
Data is from the United Nations Comtrade Database, available at 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/rfGlossaryList.aspx# (last visited Feb. 15, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/WAX8-A9BC. Figures are in millions of U.S. 
dollars. 
 
 
Table 3: Electronics / Telecommunications 
 
 High 
Research 
Intensity 
Exports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Imports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Trade 
Differential 
Differential / 
(Exports + 
Imports) 
Brazil 115 14,406 -14,290 -0.9841 
China 308,821 368,209 -59,388 -0.0877 
Germany 51,961 57,550 -5,589 -0.0510 
India 4,998 16,629 -11,630 -0.5378 
Indonesia 3,670 9,823 -6,153 -0.4560 
Japan 69,910 61,790 8,120 0.0617 
Malaysia 43,677 38,513 5,164 0.0628 
Mexico  22,762 71,581 -48,820 -0.5175 
South Africa 555 4,874 -4,318 -0.7955 
South Korea 83,045 45,097 37,948 0.2961 
Spain 2,599 8,741 -6,142 -0.5416 
Ukraine 452 2,422 -1,971 -0.6858 
USA  132,277 158,857 -26,580 -0.0913 
 
Includes: semiconductors, electronic circuits, video and sound devices, and 
optical fiber cables 
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Table 4: Computers / Office Machines 
 
 High 
Research 
Intensity 
Exports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Imports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Trade 
Differential 
Differential / 
(Exports + 
Imports) 
Brazil 72 4,725 -4,653 -0.9701 
China 210,321 74,087 136,234 0.4790 
Germany 15,704 26,113 -10,409 -0.2489 
India 448 6,207 -5,758 -0.8652 
Indonesia 2,086 2,842 -757 -0.1535 
Japan 5,517 23,214 -17,697 -0.6160 
Malaysia 12,797 6,409 6,388 0.3326 
Mexico  19,429 14,842 4,587 0.1339 
South Africa 243 2,500 -2,257 -0.8227 
South Korea 9,241 7,912 1,329 0.0775 
Spain 746 4,179 -3,433 -0.6969 
Ukraine 36 314 -278 -0.7944 
USA  65,655 107,296 -41,641 -0.2408 
 
Includes: automatic data processing units, storage units, input and output units, 
and analogue or hybrid data-processing machines 
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Table 5: Scientific Instruments 
 
 High 
Research 
Intensity 
Exports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Imports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Trade 
Differential 
Differential / 
(Exports + 
Imports) 
Brazil 597 4,958 -4,362 -0.7852 
China 59,048 113,310 -54,262 -0.3148 
Germany 47,358 23,011 24,347 0.3460 
India 1,352 5,395 -4,042 -0.5991 
Indonesia 400 6,596 -6,195 -0.8855 
Japan 37,936 17,111 20,825 0.3783 
Malaysia 6,029 4,250 1,779 0.1731 
Mexico  5,451 8,885 -3,434 -0.2395 
South Africa 419 1,494 -1,075 -0.5619 
South Korea 36,075 16,648 19,426 0.3685 
Spain 1,685 3,664 -1,979 -0.3700 
Ukraine 243 813 -570 -0.5396 
USA  58,744 54,379 4,365 0.0386 
 
Includes: electro-diagnostic apparatuses, optical instruments and apparatuses, 
measuring instruments and apparatuses, photographic and cinematographic 
cameras 
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Table 6: Pharmacy 
 
 High 
Research 
Intensity 
Exports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Imports 
High 
Research 
Intensity 
Trade 
Differential 
Differential / 
(Exports + 
Imports) 
Brazil 2,101 2,797 -697 -0.1422 
China 3,753 2,794 959 0.1465 
Germany 17,580 18,415 -835 -0.0232 
India 929 1,153 -224 -0.1074 
Indonesia 94 294 -200 -0.5166 
Japan 1,026 6,105 -5,079 -0.7122 
Malaysia 39 173 -134 -0.6352 
Mexico  314 1,511 -1,197 -0.6558 
South Africa 21 367 -346 -0.8914 
South Korea 600 1,267 -667 -0.3574 
Spain 2,806 2,990 -184 -0.0317 
Ukraine 23 375 -352 -0.8842 
USA  14,687 13,826 862 0.0302 
 
Includes: antibiotics, vaccines, and hormones 
 
  
 
 
 
